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among systems developers, the business client, the SDM, and the context surrounding its use.
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multi-dimensional model of power, offering explanations of political inactivity by
developers. In this paper we discuss how all three theory can be combined in a framework for
analyzing the power relations between developers and the business client. We apply this
theoretical framework in a case study of the deployment of a mandated in-house developed
systems development methodology in a large IT department of a major Australian bank Here
we will show how, from the perspective of developers, the business client exercise both overt
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In this paper we argue that a combination of concepts from Lamb & Kling’s (2003) user as 
social actor model, Scott’s (2001) institutional theory, and Hardy’s (1985) model of 
unobtrusive power can constitute a useful theoretical framework for understanding the 
relations between developers and the business client, and for exploring the role that a systems 
development methodology (SDM) can play in influencing this relationship.  
Markus & Mao (2004) highlighted the importance of understanding better the role of 
developer-client relationship, with a call to develop theory by imploring researchers to ask, 
“what happens when developers interact with the business client during development, and 
why?’  These authors also identified that the literature has been largely silent on the 
important characteristics of developers, and that the voice of the developer compared to those 
of the client, has been considerably under-researched.  
This study addresses the developer-business client relationship from a power perspective. It 
examines a combination of overt and covert control mechanisms used by the client to 
maintain power over the developer. The aim of the paper is to develop a theoretical 
framework that combines important insights from three distinct but complimentary theory 
and to apply this framework in the analysis of systems developers’ perceptions of their 
relationship with the business client.  
One theory is Lamb and Kling’s (2003) social actor framework that enables us to explore the 
relationships and complexity of dynamics between developers and the business client, and for 
exploring human/technology interactions.  The second is a unified and general theory of 
institutional behaviour, articulated by Scott (2001). The other is a specific theory of power 
relations first articulated by Lukes (1974), and adapted by Hardy (1985) and her colleagues 
(Hardy & Leiba-O’Sulivan, 1998), known as a theory of unobtrusive power.  




Lamb and Kling’s conceptualisation of a social actor provides a useful structure for exploring 
the milieu of SDM enactment that both developers and the business client engage in. In the 
analysis of the case data, Lamb and Kling’s framework (presented in Table 2) consisting of 
the constructs of affiliations, environments, interactions and identities were used to identify 
sources of power, illustrated structures of power embedded within the SDM, and portrayed 
power inequalities between the developer and client. What is missing from the social actor 
framework are explanations of how power is transmitted or maintained. 
Scott’s (2001) view of new institutional theory (via his 3-pillars framework – see Table 4), 
helps bridge the gap between identifying sources of power and showing how institutional 
structures (such as authority, norms and values) embedded in the SDM are mechanisms to 
transmit power in the ISD process. In our presentation of the case data, we also uncovered 
how the attitudes and behaviour of developers appeared to be submissive and were oblivious 
to any covert power scenario. This left us puzzled about the underlying reasoning or 
motivations behind this political behaviour, and with a more general concern about the role of 
power and politics in ISD. We concluded that this level of understanding required an 
additional level of organisational diagnosis. As is the case of all meta theory, new 
institutional theory is an abstraction of actual social relations, and does not answer the 
question as to why developers are compliant with an unequal power scenario. Our own 
answer to this question makes use of a specific theory of organisational power, known as 
Hardy’s (1985) theory of unobtrusive power (see Table 5). 
The paper makes three principal contributions. First, in terms of theoretical contribution, the 
paper shows how all three theory can compliment each other in order to more fully 
understand how a SDM can influence the power relationship between the business client and 
the systems developer. Second, the paper presents a modified and extended version of 
Hardy’s (1985) multi-dimensional model of power based on a source of power emanating 




externally from institutionalised environmental structures (see Figure 2). Third, we present in 
ten theoretical statements (see Table 6), how the principles of institutional theory, and a 
specific theory of unobtrusive power can be used to better understand and explain politics and 
power relations in information systems development projects. 
Conceptual Arguments 
It will be argued in this paper, that methods of systems development encode organisational 
values in the form of institutional structures. By structures, we refer to the policies and 
practices embedded in the method that constitute both the “structural” and “symbolic” 
exercise of power (Markus and Bjørn-Andersen, 1987). We define institutions as taken for 
granted standardised sequences of activity (habits) which establish and maintain features of 
social life (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and according to new institutional theory (Scott, 
2001) these influence mechanisms force organisations and individuals to conform to norms, 
traditions, and social expectations. We further argue, therefore, that the constraints based 
around the mandated and everyday use of a methodology by systems developers are not just a 
form of direct or overt power, but instead are essentially covert or unobtrusive and 
institutionalised in the form of development policy as a means of legitimizing power.  
This argument is advanced through the analysis of power relations in a large organisation in 
the financial sector (The Bank – a pseudonym) with an internal software development 
division, where the business client is able to exercise considerable power over systems 
developers. In The Bank it will be illustrated how the mandated use of a method constrains 
systems developers through the necessity of gaining sign-off and further funding at each 
stage of development enabling the business client to exercise control and subsequent 
subjugation of developers in the systems development process. 
The basis of our argument begins with a fundamental ontological assumption that the 
material artefact (the systems development method) shapes human social context, and 




reciprocally, the method is shaped by human social context. Our key premise is that neither 
the material artefact nor the developer is without agency. That is, the developer’s ability to 
shape their working practice (their individual agency) is constrained by a number of social 
norms and organisational constraints. Nor is the developer an abstraction that enacts the 
method in a social vacuum. Rather, the systems developer is best conceptualised as a social 
actor and not a technically focussed tool user (Lamb & Kling, 2003). Similarly, the term 
‘enactment’ means more than ‘use’. ‘Use’ is a simple word conjuring up an image of the 
method as an objective tool, and implying a separation between the technical and the social 
(the context of its use). Our working definition of enactment therefore is a process in which 
social actors (systems developers and the business client) respond in a dynamic interplay 
between order within The Bank (structure), their individual freedom (agency), and how the 
method is perceived by developers to build systems in a specific project situation. Most 
importantly, this interplay is situated in a social context and is bounded by physical 
surroundings and material artifacts such as the systems development method. 
A focus on social context is also emphasised by Nørbjerg and Kraft (2002). They suggest that 
among the studies of method enactment, few pay attention to the role of context, or social and 
institutional structures embedded in the method. Chae and Poole (2005) go further by arguing 
that previous research on methods tends to focus on the features of the method and systems 
developer’s behaviours while underemphasising the role of context and institutional 
structures.  
Other IS research also feature the importance of developing a holistic understanding of the 
working relationships between systems developers and the business client. For instance, Day 
(2007) developed a framework showing how the organisational setting, attitudes of 
individuals, social processes and outcomes affect how relationships are built. A key finding 
of her work is that good working relationships between the information systems organisation 




(IT department) and the business client will be established when their belief states are 
congruent or similar. Where belief states are not similar, or where there is a conflict of 
interests, Day (2007) recommends a power-based perspective to understand the unequal 
relations that can exist between developer and client. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Recognising that too few studies have directly addressed the enactment of methodologies in 
the context of power between developers and the business client, attempts were made to seek 
a theoretical explanation within the organisational and information systems literature. We had 
a need for theory and an analytical framework that addressed issues of agency, the 
technological artefact, the role that developers play in enacting the methodology, power 
relations between developers and the business client, and at different levels of analysis. 
The Role of Agency 
In the Introduction, we stated our fundamental ontological assumption that the material 
artifact, (the SDM) shapes human social context, and reciprocally, the SDM is shaped by 
human social context. This reciprocal interaction is a core premise of structuration theory and 
Giddens’ (1984) concept of duality of structure. However, in structuration theory the agent is 
always a human, while the role of the technical artifact is restricted to being part of the 
structural foundations for human agency. Our key premise is that both the material artefact 
and the developer has a form of agency. Clearly our premise is incompatible with that of 
structuration theory. 
In explicating the role of agency in our case, we argue that The Bank’s methodology presents 
a combination of human and disciplinary agency. Pickering’s (1995) theory of practice of 
science (cited in Chae & Poole, 2005) provides key insights for our discussion of agency in 
systems development. Pickering argues that agency refers to a thing or person that acts to 
produce a particular result. That is, agency at its base is the ability to do something or have 




effects. He distinguishes three different types of agency: the material agency of the natural 
world, which acts via natural laws; human agency, characterised by human intent, reflexive 
monitoring of action, and meaningful construction of the social world; and disciplinary 
agency, in which the agency of a discipline – such as systems development – leads people 
through a series of actions and also neutralises these actions for them. Disciplinary agency 
therefore is defined as the shaping and channeling of human action by conceptual and cultural 
systems. Disciplines are bodies of knowledge that preserve concepts, practices, and values 
that can be employed in action (Chae and Pole, 2005:23).  
In this case, we provide an argument that SDMs are institutions that exert their own form of 
agency. We do so by providing grounded description of systems developers working within a 
discipline that provides scaffolding for their actions. Through the application of Lamb & 
Kling’s (2003) model, we identify how the discipline of systems development provides 
generalisable procedures (stage gate funding, sign-off, etc) applied in the enactment of the 
SDM that are largely based on power structures involving the client and developer. Through 
the application of Scott’s (2001) framework – also known as the 3 pillars – we illustrate how 
the discipline of systems development within The Bank is legitimized by change resistant 
norms and values. 
As our interest lies in investigating the interactions among actors in relation to a specific 
SDM in the context of a wider socio-economic and political landscape, we adopt an 
institutional lens in line with other IS researchers (Avgerou, 2000; Gosain, 2004; Currie, 
2009; Currie & Swanson, 2009). While new institutional theory is a powerful framework to 
explain the effects or outcomes of institutional pressures on the actions of developers and 
clients in work practices, it does not explicitly take into account our question of how in a 
situation of unequal power relations, why conflict does not arise. To extend our understanding 
of SDM enactment, we thus argue for the use of complementary theories to the institutional 




perspective, and recommend Hardy’s (1985) multi-dimensional theory of power and Lamb & 
Kling’s (2003) model of a social actor to add focus to details of local practices. We suggest 
that each theoretical perspective has its own explanatory power and that a combination of the 
three theories facilitates a much richer interpretation of SDM enactment by linking micro, 
meso, and macro levels of analysis.  
An important distinction between the three theories is the level of analysis addressed. While 
new institutional theory primarily focuses on meso and macro-level structures addressing the 
organisational field level and organisational level of analysis (Currie & Swanson, 2009), the 
social actor model primarily addresses micro, meso, and macro level processes (Lamb & 
Kling, 2003). On the other-hand, in Hardy’s multi-dimensional model of power the focus is 
on meso levels of analysis. We argue that a combination of all three theories provides a multi-
level analysis of SDM enactment in The Bank, as each theory has its explanatory power in 
either micro, meso, or macro level processes. Furthermore, the social actor model has its 
theoretical antecedents in institutional theory and is logically compatible due to their 
philosophical tradition; all three theories can be classified as social theories; institutional 
theory and Hardy’s model are process theories; and all three can be used to address related 
phenomena of power. In Table 1, we juxtapose the three theories and present their theoretical 
foundations, key constructs used in our empirical analysis, primary levels of analysis, and 
main arguments. 
Below we outline the application of each of the theories in the IS literature to show their 
explanatory power at different levels of analysis, and then discuss the value of combining the 
three theory.   




Table 1: Explanatory Power of Three Theory on SDM Enactment 
 User as social actor model (Lamb & Kling, 
2003) 
Institutional Theory (Scott, 2001) Multi-dimensional Theory of Power (Hardy, 







The user as social actor is based on the 
concepts of new institutional theory ( Di 
Maggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996; Scott, 2001) and social constructivism 
(Leonardi & Barley, 2010 ). A social actor is 
an organizational entity whose interactions 
are simultaneously enabled and constrained 
by socio-technical affiliations and 
environments of the firm, its members and its 
industry. 
Institutional theory is a body of knowledge 
that studies the relationships between 
organisations and their environments focusing 
on how structures become established as 
guidelines for social behaviour. Institutions 
are taken for granted standardised sequences 
of activity which establish and maintain 
features of social life (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). According to Scott (2001) influence 
mechanisms force individuals and 
organisations to conform to norms, traditions, 
and social expectations. 
Power can be understood through four dimensions. 
The first three dimensions based on Critical theory 
and Ideological hegemony follow Lukes (1974) 
concept of control over resources, processes and 
meaning. Dimension 1: resources influence the 
decision-making process; Dimension 2: control 
access to this resource; Dimension 3: hegemonic 
process, legitimation of power through cultural and 
normative assumptions; Dimension 4: power of the 












Institutions are comprised of: 
Regulative,  
Normative, and  
Cultural-cognitive  
analytical elements (three-pillars) that provide 
a basis for legitimacy, and hence, social 
conformance.  
Overt power: material and structural resources 
(information, expertise, control over rewards and 
punishment). 
Unobtrusive power: ability to prevent conflict from 
arising. Symbolic aspects: ability to give meaning 
to events and actions. 
Institutionalisation of power within structural and 
cultural arrangements. Symbols, language, myths, 
rituals, ceremonies, settings. 





Societal,                                     Macro 
organisational field,  
organization,                              Meso 
organisational sub-system, 
Individual.                                  Micro 
Societal,                                           Macro 
organisational field,  
organization, .                                 Meso 
organisational sub-system 
Individual.                                       Micro 
Groups, 





According to the social actor model, people’s 
individual autonomy and their behaviours are 
shaped by the social norms, institutional 
forces, and other social and physical 
structures that surround them. 
The three pillars of institutions are transmitted 
by being embedded in various types of 
repositories or carriers: symbolic systems, 
relational systems, routines, and artifacts. 
Sources of unobtrusive power are: (i) ideological 
hegemony of wider society, and (ii) dominant 
organizational members have the ability to 
institutionalise their existing power in structures & 
culture to protect it from change; and to manage its 
meaning.  




Social Actor Model 
Lamb & Kling’s (2003) social actor model is a multi-level construct spanning the individual 
(micro) and organizational (meso) levels of analysis. As it is relatively new, very few 
researchers have used this framework in their empirical research. Exceptions include 
Rowlands (2007, 2008) and Ferneley & Light (2008). 
For this research we draw on the user as a social actor model (Lamb & Kling, 2003) as part 
of our theoretical framework with its antecedents in institutional theory. Drawing on the work 
of Scott (2001), Lamb (2006) describes how the social actor concept has been theoretically 
supported by new institutionalist approaches, whereby institutions provide a framing context 
within which social actors make constrained choices about ICT use, particularly when they 
are situated in organisations. According to the social actor model, people’s individual 
autonomy and their behaviours are shaped by the social norms, institutional forces, and other 
social and physical structures that surround them. This approach compliments what 
Orlikowski and Iacono (2001) identify as the ‘ensemble view’ of technology where 
technologies are components of a more complex socio-technical ensemble that include 
people, work practices, and institutional and cultural factors. In terms of this research 
example in The Bank, structure includes work procedures mandated by the SDM, the day-to-
day interactions within and among project groups, and authority based on power and 
expertise. In this view, systems developers can be seen as complex social actors acting in 
constrained ways, rather than simple “users” of the SDM  (Lamb and Kling, 2003), and 
where the SDM operates largely as a structure around which systems developers operate. 
A key feature of the model is that it focuses on people, their context, and their information 
technologies as the basic unit of research analysis. According to Lamb (2006) the term social 
actor is a construct that conflates people’s interactions, their information environments, and 
their technologies. Consequently, the user is reconceptualised − not as a “technically 




focused” or “socially thin”, passive user of technology − but a person who acts purposefully 
with and through information and communication technology (ICT) in a social setting for 
particular ends. To avoid potential confusion, we need to point out that in our case involving 
systems developers, it is the developers and the business client who are the ‘users’ of the 
technology (the SDM), in contrast to conventional MIS literature, where the user is often 
portrayed (let’s say) as an office worker being the recipient of a developed system. 
Seen as a means to explain the role that SDMs play in influencing the systems developer-
business client relationship, and as a structure for exploring the milieu of technology 
interactions that developers engage in, the user as social actor model is most appropriate and 
was chosen for both theoretical and methodological reasons. As Lamb & Kling (2003: 219) 
offered, “the model provides a framework for the systematic research of complex, highly 
contextualised ICT use in organisations, rather than the study of isolated aspects of ICT use 
in de-contextualised settings”. We also considered that the model provides an appropriate 
theoretical lens to examine SDM enactment; first, because of its emphasis on exploring the 
impact of institutional structures on the enactment process in organisational settings; and 
second, because of its focus on networked technologies in increasingly knowledge-intensive 
industries such as the finance and IT industry. 
In terms of research method, our case made use of the social actor model by illuminating 
enactment at multiple levels or jurisdictions of the institutional form: individual/micro 
(systems developers and clients as social actors), organisational sub-system/meso level (the 
IT department with The Bank), organisation (The Bank), and organisational field/macro level 
(the finance and IT industry).  
The social actor model involves four dimensions as shown in the Table 2 ― affiliations, 
environment, interactions, and identities,  that characterise organisational members and their 
enactment context. According to Lamb (2006) interactions and identities relate 




organisationally situated individuals to others and to the information technologies they use to 
interact with and present themselves to others (micro). The first two dimensions ― 
affiliations and environments relate people to their organisation, and to the industries and 
environments of those organisations (meso and macro).  
The social actor model was used a priori in the first stage of analysis as a coding mechanism 
to help make sense of what occurred in the field at primarily a micro and meso level, 
providing a set of sensitising constructs (codes) to be investigated, and guided our 
interpretation and focus. See Table 2 for codes and coded examples from the case. 
Institutional Theory and the 3-pillars Framework 
Institutional theory is also a multi-level construct spanning the individual, organisational sub-
system, organisation, and organisational field (micro, meso and macro) levels of analysis; and 
is increasingly been used in IS research (Currie & Swanson, 2009). Building on Scott’s 
(2001) view of new institutional theory, we see this as a body of knowledge that studies the 
relationships between organisations and their environments focussing on how structures 
become established and/or institutionalised as guidelines for social behaviour. Institutions, 
therefore, are taken for granted standardised sequences of activity which establish and 
maintain features of social life (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and according to new 
institutional theory (Scott, 2001) these influence mechanisms force organisations to conform 
to norms, traditions, and social expectations. Although rules, norms and cultural beliefs are 
central properties of institutions, the concept of institution also encompasses associated 
behaviour and material resources: that is the activities that produce and reproduce them. The 
concept of institution also has a broad sense in institutional theory – that is, institutions are 
not only organisations, they can be entities such as a SDM. In order for an entity to be 
considered institution however, Tolbert & Zucker (1996) contend that an institution should 
have gone through a historical process of institutionalisation involving three components: 




habitualisation, objectification, and sedimentation. When sedimentation is reached, the new 
structure is completely spread among actors involved and full institutionalisation is reached 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1996).  
Table 2: A Social Actor View of Affiliations, Environment, Interactions and Identities 
Characteristics & Behaviours of 
Connected and Situated Individuals 




Coded examples from the Case  
 
Affiliations [A]   
Relationships are multilevel, multivalent, 
multi-network i.e. local/global group, 
organisation, inter-group, inter-
organisational. 
[A-SOCIAL] Project managers & developers are required to deal 
with clients and development partners from various 
sections (SOCIAL networks) internal and external 
to The Bank to complete the project.  
As relationships change, interaction 
practices migrate within & across 
organisations.  
[A-CHANGE] Developers regularly interact with external 
organisations when aspects of projects have been 
outsourced; or when dealing with contractors 
brought in on a needs basis. These interactions 
bring about pressure to CHANGE the SDM.  
Environment [E]   
Organisational environments exert 
technical and institutional pressures on 
firms and their members. 
[E-STAND] With a mixture of skill sets, employee mobility 
from within and external to the Bank, and the 
requirement to conform to industry codes of 
practice, STANDards were necessary. 
Interactions [IN]   
Organisational members seek to 
communicate in legitimate ways. 
[IN-DOCN] The SDM mandates documentation [DOCN] 
throughout all phases & calls for meetings, both 
formal & informal among affiliates to review them.  
Organisational members build, design 
and develop interactions that make 
information actionable. 
[IN-ACTION] The SDM mandates the generation of specifications 
becoming actionable [ACTION] documents 
requiring a sign-off at each stage.  
ICTs become part of the interaction 
process as people transform, tailor and 
embed available informational resources 





The SDM through virtual ownership by the 
business client prevents efforts from developers 
wanting to introduce new development techniques 
and overhaul [TRANSFORM] the SDM.   
As organisational members, people 
perform socially embedded, highly 
specialised actions on behalf of the 
organisation. 
[IN-CONSTR] The SDM dictates and constrains [CONSTR] 
developers’ actions within the bank – it tells 
developers what approach they must use, and 
therefore enforces work practices. 
Identities [ID]   
Social actor identities have an ICT use 
component.  
[ID-USE] The USE of the SDM defines (some of) the identity 
of a developer. 
ICT-enhanced networks heighten 
multiple identities as expert or novice.  
[ID-IDENT] Knowledge & competent use of the SDM can 
define the developer’s IDENTity.  
Social actors use ICTs to construct 
identities, legitimise their role, and 
control perceptions. 
[ID-LEGIT] Use of the SDM LEGITimises their role as a 
developer in the eyes of the business client or 
project manager. 




In our field study, we understand institution to manifest itself as taken for granted or 
standardised activities that shape and in our case, they represent constraints on the options 
that individuals and collectives are likely to exercise on work practices. Using this working 
definition and the historical requirements of Tolbert & Zucker (1996), we consider the SDM 
has become institutionalised within The Bank because of its longevity of use and its 
associated practices have become routine. Similarly, as the analysis will show, the SDM goes 
relatively unnoticed where developers take it for granted in performing their day-to-day work. 
Scott (2001) provides an encompassing framework bringing some coherence to the wide-
ranging literature on new institutional theory. This framework known as the ‘three pillars’ or 
three pressures (see Figure 1) posits that institutions are comprised of regulative, normative 
and cultural-cognitive analytical elements, that together with associated activities and 
resources, provides a different basis for legitimacy, and hence, social conformance (Scott, 
2001:48). The regulative pillar gives emphasis to the role of coercion, mandates, monitoring 
and sanctions to establish and maintain formal and informal systems of behaviour. The 
normative pillar draws on the concepts of appropriateness, expectation and introduces an 
obligatory dimension to social life. This view defines what people should do and prescribes 
how things should be done, legitimising role-based actions of individuals. The cultural-
cognitive pillar stresses the frames through which meaning is made by individuals. This view 
explains how individuals’ everyday actions are constrained by the common beliefs and 
culturally supported norms and values that shape their interactions in their social world. The 
three pillars form a continuum moving from the conscious (legally enforced) to the 
unconscious (taken for granted). These three pillars of institutions, according to Scott (2001) 
are transmitted by being embedded in various types of repositories or carriers. Scott 
(2001:77) identifies four types of carriers: symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and 




artefacts (see Figure 1) and we provide examples from the case where these carriers 
materialise. 
 
Figure 1. Institutional Pillars and Carriers (Adapted from Scott, 2001:77) 
• Symbolic systems (rules, standard processes, values, to widely held beliefs or ideas in the 
heads of organisational actors). For example, many developers held the view that the 
method is helpful in that it provides a common language enabling communication of 
ideas between developers, the client, and those external to the organisation. 
• Relational systems (governance systems emphasising authority or power). For example, 
the business client maintains control over the development process based on funding and 
the Bank’s insistence on the mandatory use of the method 
• Routines (habitualised behaviour or repetitive patterns of activity such as standard 
operating procedures encoded into technology or soft organisational routines such as 
jobs). For example, developers were required to produce documentation at all stages of 
development, and to report to the client for sign-off before the next stage of development 
can occur. 
• Artefacts (objects complying with mandated specifications, meeting standards, or objects 
possessing symbolic value). For example, we argue that the methodology itself is an 





























2001:81).  We illustrate how the method mandates signatures; follows recognised 
industry conventions of systems development; and for developers, possesses symbolic 
value in terms of demonstrating their professional identity. 
An institutional perspective offers several advantages for our research. Firstly, according to 
Orlikowski & Barley (2001:154) an institutional perspective offers ‘a more structural and 
systematic understanding for how technologies are embedded in complex interdependent 
social, economic, and political networks, and how they are shaped by such broader 
institutional influences’. Second, a central principal of new institutional theory is that 
institutions operate at various levels, from the world system (macro) to individual action 
(micro); and are transmitted by various types of carriers, including technical artefacts (Scott, 
2001: 81). In terms of our study, Table 3 illustrates these various levels, with an additional 
level added – individuals – based on the user as social actor model. Thirdly, institutional 
theory can be used to analyse all types of organisations, because all organisations are 
institutionalised, albeit to varying degrees (Scott, 2001). For instance, all organisations (and 
in particular, The Bank) are subject to regulative processes and operate under local and 
general governance structures. All organisations are socially constituted and are subject to 
institutional processes that define what forms they can assume and how they may operate 
legitimately (Scott, 2001). 
Table 3. Levels in Institutional Analysis, adapted from Scott (2001:85) 
LEVEL THE CASE 
World system  
Societal Australia 
Organisational field The finance & IT sector 
Organisational population Australia’s top 4 trading banks 
Organisation The Bank 
Organisational subsystems IT division within The Bank 
Individuals Systems developers 
Gosain (2004) called for empirical evidence, through qualitative studies, of how technical 




artefacts act as institutional carriers. In response to Gosain’s call, the second stage of analysis 
provides examples from the case demonstrating how the day-to-day work activities of 
developers are constrained by the institutional nature of the technical artefact  the SDM. 
While institutional theory is useful in describing and explaining how political pressures, 
institutional constraints, professional traditions socially construct the context in which the 
SDM is enacted, it is less useful in explaining how individuals respond to these institutional 
pressures, or explain the dynamics between developers and the client, and why in our case 
grievances did not exist. We suggest complementing institutional theory with a specific 
model of power (Hardy, 1985; Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan 1998) to understand better the 
dynamics between developer and client. 
Power Frameworks  
In this section, we rectify the omission of power from discussions of method enactment by 
discussing power as a complex, multidimensional concept. In general, ‘power has to do with 
relationships between two or more actors in which the behaviour of one is affected by the 
behaviour of the other’ (Jasperson et al, 2002:399). Recognising that this concept has 
multiple meanings, Jasperson et al (2002) defined power to include authority, decision rights, 
influence, politics or power. These authors also identified a number of paradigms underlying 
power research and four lenses to better understand researcher’s views regarding the causal 
structure between IT and organisational power. The four lenses (based on a modified version 
of Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) framework of sociological paradigms) are: rational, pluralist, 
interpretive and radical.  
This research adopts aspects of a combination of Jasperson et al’s (2002:406) pluralist and 
interpretive perspectives of power. In the pluralist lens, actors are assumed to have different, 
potentially conflicting interests. This perspective defines power in terms of actors’ ability to 
influence others’ behaviours. A pluralist conceptualisation of power assumes that resources, 




possession of resources, and the resulting dependency relationship are characteristics of the 
social context. Unlike the pluralist perspective with a focus on resources, the interpretive 
perspective deals primarily with perceptions and the processes that shape them. Power is 
defined in terms of actors’ (the business client’s) ability to control and to shape the dominant 
interpretation of organisational events. In this perspective, ‘whoever controls the dialogue, 
and hence the formation of subjective meaning, has the power to alter another actor’s 
perspective, and ultimately determine outcomes’ (Jasperson et al, 2002:412). 
Only a few studies focus on the deployment of methods in their social and organisational 
contexts and the power relations existing between developers and the business client in this 
context. Markus and Bjørn-Anderson (1987) provide some reference of its early occurrence 
by providing a framework to identify different forms of exercised power to make business 
clients and systems developers more aware of the influence of power. Their framework 
presented two dimensions of context and target demarcating four types of power exercise: 
technical, structural, conceptual and symbolic. Their view of power was somewhat 
controversial because the dominant literature on power (at the time) tended to focus primarily 
on overt power, that is, when two parties disagree and the behaviour of one party is intended 
to influence the outcome.  
Markus and Bjørn-Anderson (1987) drew on the work of Lukes (1974) to consider covert 
issues: looking beyond observable conflict to consider why grievances are not formulated, 
and why conflict does not arise. Their ‘structural’ and ‘symbolic’ exercise of power is 
relevant to this study as it describes the exercise of power taking place, not within a particular 
project, but rather over time as organisational structures and routine operating procedures – in 
the form of institution –  offer the client formal authority over developers or foster 
dependence on them for resources. According to Markus and Bjørn-Anderson (1987:500) “in 
this structural exercise of power it is primarily the development of policies and practices that 




constitutes the exercise of power, … and that structural constraints on [developers] can 
obviate the need for more direct [or overt] forms of power”.  
Since the publication of Markus and Bjørn-Anderson (1987) other writers have utilized and 
adapted Lukes (1974) three-dimension view of power. Hardy (1985; 1996) and Hardy & 
Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) integrated Lukes’ three-dimensional view of power into a four-
dimensional model which incorporates both the use of power to defeat declared and 
identifiable opponents, and its use to prevent resistance, known as covert or unobtrusive 
power. Unobtrusive power concerns attempts to create legitimacy and justification for certain 
arrangements, so that outcomes are never questioned. From our search of the information 
systems literature, Hardy’s model has rarely been used in prior IS studies, with three notable 
exceptions: Dhillon (2004), Howcroft and Light (2006), and Howcroft and McDonald (2007). 
However, Hardy’s model of unobtrusive power has been used extensively in the 
organisational and management literature. 
In this research we apply Hardy’s (1985) multi-dimensional model of power to help us 
understand the dynamics between developers and the business client involving power and 
authority, and how these relations shape method enactment. Hardy’s model is appropriate to 
our case as it examines both overt and unobtrusive uses of power, and offers explanations of 
political inactivity. That is, understanding a situation of unequal power relations, where 
grievances do not exist, or conflict does not arise. In the Discussion section, we return to 
Hardy’s power model, to examine the conditions that resulted in the subjugation of 
developers by the business client. 
Combining all Three Theory 
 By applying the four constructs of identities, interactions, affiliations and environment, the 
social actor model, together with constructs from institutional theory on regulative, normative 
and cognitive pressures; and the construct of meaning from Hardy’s model of power, we are 




able to conduct a multi-level analysis of SDM enactment. Before we apply the three theories 
to our study of SDM enactment, we briefly present our research approach. 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Complete descriptions of the research procedures have been presented and published 
elsewhere as work-in-progress (Rowlands, 2007). This paper only presents follow-up analysis 
and further discussion of the findings. 
The original research approach adopted in this ongoing study is that of an interpretive case 
study (Walsham, 1995; Klein & Myers, 1999). The research study was carried out in a large 
Australian bank. The banking and financial services sector was chosen because of the 
extremely important role that IT plays in the success of companies in this industry, and The 
Bank selected has extensive experience and use in practice of an in-house developed systems 
development method. 
ANALYSIS 
Preliminary analysis of data has been presented previously (Rowlands, 2008) and due to 
space restrictions cannot be repeated here. However in summary, the findings (1) illustrated 
structures of systems development embedded in the method; (2) portrayed power inequalities 
where systems developers are dependent on the business client; and (3) identified that the 
business client can be considered a methodology user too.  
Using the user as social actor model, the affiliation examples presented in Rowlands (2008) 
confirm the inherent power of the business client. The interviews confirmed that in the end it 
is the business client who has control over the systems development process, and bears the 
most responsibility for the system in terms of funding and signing off on it. Systems 
developers need the business client to fund the design and construction of new or enhanced 
systems. However, there is a dichotomy of mind-sets. The business client is portrayed as 




more interested in controlling costs, monitoring deadlines and delivering projects on time, 
whereas the developer is more interested in building quality systems and employing their 
technical expertise. 
The affiliation examples also tell us that it is the policies and practices embedded in the 
method through sign-off and stage-gate funding constitutes a form of ‘structural’ exercise of 
power (Markus and Bjørn-Anderson, 1987) in the form of developer dependence on the 
business client for important resources. While a form of overt power, this finding indicates 
that the constraints based around the accepted and everyday use of a methodology by systems 
developers obviates the need for more direct forms of control. Our findings also indicate that 
control structures embedded in the methodology, while not undetected by developers, remain 
largely un-discussed. For instance, many interviewees when asked if they discussed the 
relative merits of the methodology with other colleagues said ‘they did not’ as the following 
excerpt from a programmer illustrates: 
It’s one of those things that you discuss when you’re relatively new to the organisation but after 
that it’s just accepted.  You do it because it’s part of the culture.  You don’t necessarily discuss 
it in a meeting or at lunch.  You don’t say to someone ‘Awww crikey, I’m having a problem with 
that part of [the method], so I probably wouldn’t discuss it very often.   
Second, in the environment section, Rowlands (2008) provided where the environment the 
bank operates in greatly effects the enactment of the method. Examples of adherence to 
industry-wide and global work practices included: development phases being based on the 
traditional water-fall life-cycle, systems built complying to standards imposed by regulatory 
agencies such as the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, The Bank mimicking other 
organisations by placing the methodology on an intranet site, and having to conform to 
specifications agreed to with major technology partners. These examples illustrate a source of 
power emanating from other than the business client. The environment imposes on the 




developer a requirement to comply with industry, national and global work practices, where 
the enactment of the method is subject to external institutional forces.  
From the interactions section, excerpts from Rowlands (2008) illustrate how the development 
life-cycle, sign-off, and routine patterns of work embedded within the method create a 
mechanism for the business client to exert and maintain control over the systems 
development group. The excerpts illustrate that the business client has ‘ownership’ of the 
method and therefore has control over important aspects of systems development, and 
accordingly is able to exert unobtrusive power over systems developers. What has not been 
reported in the literature before is that through ownership and control, the business client can 
be considered a user of the methodology too. 
As reported in Rowlands (2008) the identities section, developers are dependent on the 
business client to validate and legitimate their contributions to the organisation. Knowing 
how to use the methodology and using the methodology competently can construct their 
identities, legitimise their role, and construct perceptions that they are professional. There 
were multiple data points confirming that the enactment of the methodology legitimises their 
role as a systems developer in the eyes of a project manager or the business client. Hence, 
systems developers pursue their interests directly by invoking ‘directives’ prescribed by the 
methodology, while acknowledging the legitimacy of the business client.  
In sum, examples in Rowlands (2008) of how structures operating at various levels of the 
organisational field provide an overarching, framing context within which systems 
developers often made constrained choices about methodology use. The first author inquired 
into the circumstances within which systems developers used the method, and identified 
conditions that resulted in the subjugation of developers by the business client, leaving them 
with little control over the development process. We conclude that the advantages in terms of 




whose interests are met in the systems development process are clearly in favour of the 
business client.  
DISCUSSION 
You will recall that our motivation for this paper was to develop a theoretical framework that 
combines important insights from three distinct but complimentary theory; to apply this 
framework in the analysis of systems developers’ perceptions of their relationship with the 
business client; and to explore the role that methods can play in influencing this relationship. 
Our particular concern was with the views of systems developers enacting a local and 
mandatory method in their workplace, and in understanding the unequal power relations 
between developers and the business client.  The following section revisits these motives in 
the light of the research findings.  
How does the Method Influence the Developer/Client Relationship? 
Using Lamb & Kling’s (2003) social actor model as a means for analysing the case text, 
Rowlands (2008) found that pre-existing structures embedded in the method constrain the 
actions of the systems developer. An analysis of the transcripts through the lens of the social 
actor model enabled us to identify the source of authority and power afforded the business 
client, and to identify mechanisms of unmistakable power operating in The Bank. One local 
source of covert power in favour of the business client is a set of development procedures 
(sign off, and the stage gate approval process) that have transpired over time to 
institutionalize their interests in structures embedded in the method. As a consequence of the 
method being ‘virtually’ owned and controlled by the business client, and the method being 
mandated, developers were constrained in their actions by the apparent neutral technology of 
the method (the methods and techniques of systems development); and the need to 
‘rationalise’ their work practice – a common theme among developers is that ‘we all need to 
use the method to speak a common language’. A local source of overt power in favour of the 




client is the inevitable market pressures such as the clients’ ability to outsource development 
work rendering the developer dependent on the client and subject to unreasonable demands in 
terms of schedules. 
To extend our understanding of the role that methods can play in influencing the relationship 
between developer and client, we frame our discussion by drawing upon contributions from 
institutional theory (Scott, 2001) by showing how institutional structures (such as authority, 
norms, and symbolic values) embedded within the methodology (c.f. Table 4) are active 
forces in the systems development process. We found that the method is a carrier of 
institutional logics and can be used to explain how the method carries power. 
In illustrating how institutional logics (processes and social structures) shape the method 
enactment process, the case shows that pre-existing structures that have developed over time 
(such as rules, norms and beliefs) embedded in the method play an active role in constraining 
and enabling developers in the ISD process. As this case demonstrated, the day-to-day work 
activities involved in systems development are rather fixed or predetermined by the 
institutionalised nature of the technical artefact – the method. For instance as summarised in 
Table 4, the structures of the method provide a repertoire of already existing institutional 
principles of work (e.g. conventions, work practices, common understandings, authority 
relationships) that developers enrol in their activities.  
With reference to Table 4, under the headings of the regulative and normative pillars, 
examples from the case provide grounded evidence of how the method encodes and embodies 
institutional principles that constrain the routines of organisational actors. Examples from the 
cultural cognitive pillar show how enactment of the method over time, leads to the 
development of change-resistant cognitive schemas (norms and values) that are perceived as 
natural and legitimate by developers. These findings accord with that of Orlikowski and 
Robey (1991:159), who claim that “systems developers draw on the values and conventions 




of their organisation, occupation, and training to build information systems…. They are 
informed by information systems development methods and knowledge about their 
organisation to build information systems.” Furthermore, this case has demonstrated, as it is 
the business client who is in control, it is the values and conventions of the business client 
that holds legitimacy in The Bank.  
Table 4. Institutional Pillars and Carriers from the Case (adapted from Scott, 2001:77) 





and rules that govern 
behaviour. 
Normative: appropriateness, 
expectations and customs 
that define and prescribe 
how things should be done. 
Cultural-Cognitive: frames 
through which meaning is 
made, such as shared beliefs 





took on a ritualistic 
character in order to 
convey a powerful 
message to developers: 
‘cooperate, come to us, 
and we will reward you’. 
Through the habitual use of 
the method template in 
producing lifecycle 
deliverables, developers used 
this as evidence of design 
creativity and work 
performance. 
Many developers held the 
view that the method provides 
a common language and 
valued standardized terms 
enabling communication of 
ideas between developers, the 




The business client 
maintains control over 
developers through 
funding. Developers can’t 
proceed until each stage is 
signed off. 
Systems developers wanted 
the method to be changed 
(updated) but the business 
client resisted. 
Developers when they join 
The Bank accept their role in 
the existing order of things 
because they see it as natural. 
Routines Systems development 
requires a standard set of 
documents to be 
completed. 
The Bank has standard job 
roles of consultant, senior 
consultant, project leader, CIO 
etc, involving a hierarchy of 
authority. 
The use of the method goes 
relatively unnoticed by 
developers. It is habitualised 
and part of the work culture of 
the organisation. 
Artefacts Method use is mandated 
for all new projects & 
maintenance projects 
The method is based on the 
traditional SDLC. External 
parties: contractors, H/W & 
telecoms. providers know the 
phases used within The Bank. 
Using the method creates an 
image for developers that they 
are professional. 




IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY-BUILDING RESEARCH 
Lamb & Kling’s (2003) user as social actor model has been applied to the study of 
information systems elsewhere: Rowlands (2007, 2008) in a study of the institutional aspects 
of method use, and Ferneley & Light (2008) in a study of different user groups’ appropriation 
of mobile and ubiquitous computing, however these works do not draw upon institutional 
theory (the three pillars) to understand the active role of the ICT as an institutional carrier. 
Our research, on the other hand, does. 
Our findings show that the method can assume the properties of an institution on the basis 
that it constitutes the background condition for action, enforcing constraints, giving direction 
and meaning, and setting the range of opportunities for undertaking action. Accordingly, we 
view the method as a social institution that exerts its own type of agency interacting with 
human agency in the systems development process.  
The case reported in this paper builds on research suggesting that methods significantly 
inform and shape the cognitions and actions of organisational members engaged in systems 
development (Hirschheim and Klein 1989). We found that the influence of the methodology 
occurs through the constraints and prescriptions of process mandated by the methodology, 
through the experiences and learning from previous use of the methodology, and through 
habitualised behaviour or routines that shapes developers’ approaches to using the method in 
their workplace. This finding is consistent with other research (Gosain, 2004) that technical 
artefacts act as an important institutional embodiment (as a carrier) serving to preserve rules 
by constraining the actions of human agents on the one hand; and that the technical artefact is 
subject to institutional forces and institutional processes that set the rules of rationality, on the 
other.  
Second, in discussing the findings in terms of power, the case depicts through the eyes of the 




developer that the business client exercises near complete control over the development 
process. This key differential finding sheds new light on understanding the recurring conflict 
of interest between developers and the business client during systems development, not 
reported in the literature so far.  
The case depicts business exercising nearly complete control over the development process 
and systems developers as playing a cooperative, but submissive role. This finding is in direct 
contrast to the deconstruction of text of the Information Engineering (Martin, 1990) systems 
development methodology (Beath and Orlikowski, 1994) and more recent findings (Hussain 
and Cornelius, 2009) about the distribution of power, control and responsibility between 
systems developers and the business client. Our case study specifically indicates that it is the 
policies of the business client embedded in the method that constitutes both overt and the 
‘symbolic’ or unobtrusive exercise of power by the client over the systems developer.  
The excerpts from Rowlands (2008) also portray the business client as protecting their sphere 
of activity while developers are not seen as protective of their interests, and are relatively 
silent on the power issues which concern them.  Why would this be the case, and why is the 
business client dominant and the systems developer compliant within an unequal power 
scenario? In answering these questions, we have found that Lamb & Kling’s (2003) model 
enables us to identify concepts of control, authority and power, but doesn’t explain how the 
concepts of power operate. We then used institutional theory and an application of Scott’s 
(2001) three pillars framework to explain how the local method carries power (as summarised 
in Table 4). While we identified power mechanisms and authority structures, the user as 
social actor model and institutional theory are silent on explanations as to why developers are 
compliant with an unequal power scenario.  
To explain this scenario, an answer is provided by Hardy’s (1985) multi-dimensional model 
of power. This model (summarised in Table 5) offers a plausible explanation in terms of 




explaining an absence of resistance, and why there is apparent cooperation from developers 
with the business client. Hardy’s model suggests that power can work at a number of 
different levels. In terms of how power is mobilized by dominant actors, on the surface 
(dimensions 1 & 2), power is exercised through the mobilization of scarce, critical resources, 
and through the control of decision-making processes. At a deeper level (dimension 3), power 
is exercised through the managing of meanings to create legitimacy for an issue and prevent 
conflict (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998).  
Table 5. Hardy’s (1985) Multi-dimensional Model of Power 
Model dimension and Explanation Examples from the Case 
Dimension 1: power of resources. 
The powerful are able to deploy key resources on 
which others depend, such as the control of 
funding. This is overt power. 
The business client has the ability to procure services in-
house or external to the organisation. Developers are 
therefore reliant on the business client for funding of 
projects.  
Dimension 2: power of decision-making 
processes.  
Some issues can be excluded from decision-
making, and the agenda confined to ‘safe’ 
questions, with opponents side-lined. 
Developers were prevented from replacing the existing 
method and acquiring a new method based on new 
techniques and re-use of code. The client said they 
‘couldn’t understand the diagrams’ and decisions were 
prevented from being taken, even though there was an 
observable conflict of subjective interest. 
Dimension 3: power of managing meaning.  
People can be prevented from having grievances 
by shaping their perceptions and preferences in 
such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things, because they see it as 
natural. This is an example of unobtrusive power. 
Developers were influenced by symbolic aspects of power 
– the use of language and rituals in the workforce. For 
example, standardised terms for communication; the 
habitual use of the method in producing lifecycle 
deliverables as evidence of work performance; and the 
ritualistic use of “walk-through” meetings with clients to 
validate the ‘accuracy’ of design decisions and to gain their 
signature of approval. Developers saw this as natural and 
legitimate. 
Hardy’s model also clarifies the conditions necessary for why opposition or conflict does not 
arise. In the first dimension, developers lose out to the client by being unable either to 
procure or deploy critical resources; in the second, by being unable to secure access to the 




decision-making forum; and in the third, by being unaware of political issues (Hardy & 
Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998). According to Lukes (1974) and Hardy (1985) power can be used to 
prevent people from having grievances by shaping their perceptions and preferences in such a 
way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural. In other words, to explain why 
developers are accepting of their situation in relation to an unequal relationship with the 
business client, we need to move our thinking to why grievances are not formulated, why 
demands are not made, and why conflict does not surface. In Hardy’s 3rd dimension of power, 
quiescence may be the result of the unobtrusive exercise of power. 
Whereas Hardy’s (1985) first two dimensions are grounded in access to material and 
structural resources such as information, expertise, control of rewards, and budgets (also 
known as overt power), unobtrusive power refers to the ability to secure preferred outcomes 
by preventing conflict from arising. The unobtrusive side of power revolves around attempts 
to create legitimacy and justification for certain arrangements, actions and outcomes so that 
they are never questioned. The essence of unobtrusive power, in this case example, is the 
ability of the business client to give meaning to events and actions, and to influence the 
perceptions of developers so that they either remain unaware of the political implications, or 
view them in a favourable way.  
The transcripts in Rowlands (2008) reported that developers are influenced by symbolic 
aspects of power – the use of language, symbols and rituals in the workforce (as illustrated in 
the row ‘Symbolic systems’ in Table 4). Developers value standardized terms for 
communication; the habitual use of the method in producing lifecycle deliverables as 
evidence of design creativity and work performance; and the use of “walk-through” meetings 
with clients to validate the ‘accuracy’ of design decisions to gain their signature of approval. 




These meetings take on a ritualistic character in order to convey a powerful message to 
developers: ‘cooperate, come to us, and we will reward you’. Unobtrusively, these symbolic 
aspects of systems work are seen by developers as legitimate development policy. Developers 
do not work outside this policy because it is seen as natural, habitual, acceptable, and is 
contextually and culturally grounded (see the Cultural-cognitive pillar in Table 4). 
Developers comply with these work arrangements because it meets their sense of professional 
reality. In terms of symbolism, the method stands for something more than a ‘way to build 
systems’. The meaning of the method comes from its context and use within the 
organizational sub-system. Analysis using the Identities dimension of the social actor model 
found that the method defines developers’ identity as competent and legitimizes their role as 
professional. Unobtrusive power then is derived from symbolic sources which are brought 
into play to legitimize outcomes in a process called the ‘management of meaning’ (Hardy, 
1985). 
Hardy (1985:396) documented a model showing the complex relationships among overt and 
covert aspects of power. In terms of theory-building, this model has been adapted and 
modified to the specifics of this case by the inclusion of external power (vii) and a necessity 
to conform (viii), and is presented in Figure 2. Figure 2 (with descriptions below) illustrates 
that the various forms of power are interwoven and should not be viewed separately.  
(i) Overt power is based on the control of resources. Success depends upon bringing these 
resources into action through power mobilization. 
(ii) The mobilization of overt power resources enables the business client to achieve 
outcomes they desire, for example control over the development process in the form of 
budget or resource allocations, or a decision outcome to outsource or not. 




(iii) Unobtrusive power is derived from symbolic sources which are brought into play to 
legitimize outcomes in a process called the management of meaning.  
(iv) Unobtrusive power can be used to influence sentiments with the use of mechanisms such 
as symbols, language, and rituals. 
(v) Unobtrusive power can produce outcomes directly. Factors such as ‘walk-through’ 
meetings with clients to obtain their signature of approval ensure that certain demands and 
challenges are never made. In this case the business client achieves outcomes by default: 
benefiting from a situation that favours them, rather than having to consciously manipulate it 














Figure 2. The External, Overt and Unobtrusive Aspects of Power. 
 (vi) Unobtrusive power can be consciously used by the business client to achieve outcomes. 
In this case the lifecycle, sign-off and routine patterns of work are used to legitimize and 
justify desired outcomes, producing favourable sentiments, and removing the threat of 
opposition – steps are taken to ‘influence’ developers to accept certain outcomes although 
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(vii) External power is derived from sector-wide social and organizational requirements in the 
form of mimicking or a necessity to conform.  
(viii) External sources of power are brought into play through a process of isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or a necessity to conform. For example, in this case regulatory 
agencies, professional codes of practice, and industry-wide practices directly influence 
method enactment outcomes.  
In conclusion, we have argued that an institutional and power perspective of methodology 
enactment brings about the identification of different elements across various levels of the 
organizational field that might otherwise escape analysis. As stated in the Introduction, a lack 
of established theory about method enactment necessitated the generation of a number of new 
perspectives and empirical insights adding to the existing body of knowledge in this arena. 
Indeed, the findings developed in this study and summarised in Table 6 define ten theoretical 
statements or high-level propositions about the distribution of power, control and 
responsibility between systems developers and the business client from an institutional 
theory, and power perspective. 
CONCLUSION 
Our theoretical contribution is the adaptation of the user as social actor model to identify 
sources of authority and power; an application of the three pillars framework to understand 
how the method carries power; and the use of a model of unobtrusive power to understand 
why developers are compliant with an unequal power scenario and how power can be used to 
prevent conflict from arising. To our knowledge, no other research has sought to combine the 
user as social actor model, institutional theory, and a power theory to investigate social 
phenomena. However, others to employ a multi-theoretical perspective to analyse politics and 
the function of power in a case study of IT implementation include Levine and Rossmore 




(1994). Furthermore, few studies in the IS literature have addressed multiple levels of 
analysis (Jensen et al, 2009).  
Table 6. Theoretical Statements from the Findings. 
1 Enactment is a complex INSTITUTIONAL process. Methods of systems development encode 
organisational values in the form of INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES. 
2 The developer is CONSTRAINED. Pre-existing structures (such as rules, norms and beliefs) 
embedded in the method and EXTERNAL forces to the organisation play an active role in 
constraining human agency in the systems development process.  
3 The method is a CARRIER of institutional logic. The method acts as a major institutional 
CARRIER where its enactment becomes taken for granted in the form of habitual behaviours and 
routine patterns of work. 
4 Enactment is CONTROLLED by the business client. The business client has ‘ownership’ of the 
method, controls the resources, and is able to exert OVERT power over the systems development 
process. 
5 Enactment is POWER based. The life-cycle and sign-off process embedded within the method 
creates a mechanism for the business client to mobilise OVERT power and thereby maintain 
control over the systems development process. 
6 Power is LEGITIMISED. Constraints based around the accepted and everyday use of a 
methodology by systems developers are not just a form of overt power, but can instead can be 
covert or UNOBTRUSIVE and institutionalised in the form of development policy as a means of 
LEGITIMISING power. 
7 The business client manages the MEANING of the method – so that using the method is considered 
by developers as LEGITIMATE development policy. Therefore, the business client should be 
considered as a METHOD USER too, and not as an independent, arbitrary provider or withholder 
of cooperation in systems development. 
8 Enactment of the methodology LEGITIMISES their role as systems developers in the eyes of the 
business client.  
9 Developers see the systems development process as UNEQUAL. However, enactment of the 
method acquiesces any CONFLICT of interest in which the business client achieves their objectives 
(CONTROL) to the relative disadvantage of developers. 
10 EXTERNAL power is derived from sector-wide social and organizational requirements in the form 
of mimicking or a necessity to conform. 
 
All research designs have limitations. First, data for our case only came from developers, and 




no business clients were interviewed or their opinions heard. We recognise the limitation of 
this approach. A natural area for future research is to study the other half in the business 
client  systems developer pair.  
Second, while we claim to have conducted multi-level research by focussing on constructs 
such as affiliations, interactions and the environment, all our empirical evidence was arrived 
at from an individual perspective or collection of individuals (group level) through personal 
interviews. The evidence collected under-represents influences of the organisational field. 
This limitation poses opportunities for advancement in terms of methodological tools for the 
collection and analysis of data at a level higher than the individual or organisational 
population (c.f. Table 3).  
Third, relatively little consideration has been given to the processes whereby institutional 
practices are established, transposed or decomposed.  This research has examined, through a 
cross-sectional design, one organisation and its practices at a given point of time. While the 
strength of this research is on identifying the constraining nature of institutional life at 
various levels, its weakness is that it remains silent on the dynamics associated with change. 
Further research to extend Lamb & Kling’s (2003) model by adding a temporal dimension 
(Lamb, 2006), is also warranted. 
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